Formal methods have brought several approaches for proving that security protocols ensure the expected security and privacy properties. Most of the resulting tools analyze protocols in symbolic models, aka. Dolev-Yao-style models. Security in the symbolic model does not imply security in the cryptographer's standard model, the computational model, where attackers are arbitrary (PPTIME) Turing machines. Computer-assisted verification techniques for the computational model have appeared only recently, and are generally less flexible or less automated than in the symbolic model. In some recent work, several colleagues and myself have proposed a new approach, elaborating on the CCSA logic of Gergei Bana and Hubert Comon. We have implemented it in a new proof assistant, Squirrel, and validated it on a variety of case studies. In this talk, I will present this approach, its benefits, and some of the remaining challenges.
This is based on work with Stéphanie Delaune, Charlie Jacomme, Adrien Koutsos and Solène Moreau, which has been accepted at S&P'21.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
La présentation sera donnée en anglais et aura lieu à distance, via BigBlueButton (BBB), dans le salon suivant : [https://bbb.irisa.fr/b/fil-nwy-r7m] (Code d'accès : 793528).